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MANDATORY ARBITRATION OF INDIVIDUAL
EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS:
THE YELLOW DOG CONTRACT OF THE 1990S
KATHERINE VAN WEZEL STONE*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a. salesperson who lost her job six months ago. You
apply for an opening at a large retail chain store. While waiting for an inter-
view, you are given a booklet labeled "Employee Handbook." Too distracted
to read, you fill out an application form, provide references, and take a simple
test. After a pro forma interview, you are offered the job. You accept, still
without opening the Handbook. Later at home, you read the Handbook. It sets
out various company rules and policies regarding tardiness, absenteeism, park-
ing spaces, holidays, overtime, dress code, obscene behavior, and so forth. On
page nine, at the end of the booklet, it says, "All disputes which arise during
the course of your employment shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to
arbitration rules maintained by the employer at its corporate headquarters."
Imagine further that after working eight months, you suffer an on-the-job
accident and have a back injury. You are out for two weeks. Before returning,
you ask for a transfer to a light work assignment. The company refuses your
request and then informs you that your old position has been eliminated and
that you are therefore dismissed.
You believe you have suffered discrimination on the basis of your handi-
cap, and so you bring a lawsuit alleging a violation of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). The employer moves to dismiss your claim on the
ground that you failed to arbitrate your ADA claim as required by the Hand-
book. You have not seen the arbitration procedures until now, but you get
them upon request. They say that all disputes between employees and the
employer shall be decided at arbitration before an arbitrator selected from a
panel of retired industry executives. You do not believe that the industry
panel, made up of individuals who are beholden to the industry and too old to
have much sympathy with the ADA, will render a fair decision in your case.
* © 1996 by Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Professor of Law, Cornell Law School and
Cornell School of Industrial and Labor Relations. B.A., Harvard University, 1970; J.D., Harvard
University Law School, 1979. The author would like to thank participants at the Symposium on
The New Private Law at the University of Denver Law School, the Law and Economics
Roundtable at the University of Pennsylvania Law School, and the Cornell-NLRB Conference on
the Sixtieth Anniversary of the NLRA in Washington, D.C., for their helpful comments and sug-
gestions. She would also like to thank Philip Hostak and Alex Colvin for their exceptional re-
search assistance.
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And you learn from your lawyer that whatever the arbitrator decides, you have
effectively no right to appeal to a court. A court will only set aside an arbitral
award for "manifest disregard of the law."
Do you have to submit your case to the panel? That is, does your employ-
er succeed in getting your case dismissed? The answer is almost certainly yes.
The court will treat the Employee Handbook as a waiver of your rights to sue
in court under most federal and state employment laws. Thus the employer, by
giving you the booklet and unilaterally establishing an arbitration procedure,
has relieved herself of numerous burdensome employment regulations. This
hypothetical describes the state of labor and employment "law" today. Note
that what we think of as "law" has become "nonlaw" at least insofar as your
legal rights have been rendered unenforceable in a judicial tribunal. Your
rights are only enforceable in a system of private justice, in a forum crafted by
your employer and foisted upon you without any real bargaining or choice.
The question is, how did we get there, and does this change from "law" to
"nonlaw" make any difference? These questions will be addressed below.
In 1935, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or
Wagner Act),' the most extensive worker rights statute ever enacted in this
country. Prior to its passage, American workers enjoyed very few statutory
rights of any type. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
Supreme Court struck down most state and federal laws that had been passed
for the protection of workers as violative of substantive due process.2 Even in
the 1930s, many judges, legal scholars, and congressmen continued to express
serious doubts about the constitutional power of the federal government to
enact legislation about private-sector labor relations.' Of course, prior to the
1930s, some workers had contractual rights that were contained in the collec-
tive agreements negotiated by their unions, but even those rights were of
dubious value given the ambiguous legal status of collective bargaining agree-
ments in the state courts.4 Thus in 1935, when the Wagner Act was passed,
1. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Wagner Act), §§ 1-16, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(1994).
2. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (holding unconstitutional law
establishing board to set minimum wage); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (holding uncon-
stitutional state law that made yellow dog contracts unlawful); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905) (holding unconstitutional law limiting hours of work in bakeries). But see Muller v. Ore-
gon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding maximum-hour law for women workers on ground that
women need special protection); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898) (upholding maximum-
hour law for coal miners on ground that the hazardous nature of the work merited special protec-
tion for such workers).
3. See, e.g., PETER IRONS, THE NEW DEAL LABOR LAWYERS 3-4 (1982); see also West
Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1930) (Van Deventer, J., dissenting, joined by
McReynolds & Butler, JJ.). There was an exception for labor relations in the railroad industry,
where Congress had exercised regulatory power since the 1880s. See generally Leifur Magnusson
& Marguerite A. Gadsby, Federal Intervention in Railroad Disputes, II MONTHLY LAB. REV. 26
(1920) (discussing history of federal railroad labor legislation).
4. In most states in the early decades of this century, employees could only enforce a right
they had under a collective agreement if they could show that they either incorporated the term
into their individual contract of hire or that the union had acted expressly as their agent in negoti-
ating the term. See William G. Rice, Jr., Collective Labor Agreements in American Law, 44 HARV.
L. REV. 572, 581-93 (1931). Thus, collective bargaining agreements were enforced, if at all, as
part of individual employment contracts; unions were not permitted to enforce them at all. In the
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American workers obtained for the first time the right to organize, the right to
engage in collective action, and the right to bargain collectively.5 These were
contained in section 7 of the statute.6
The state of workers' rights today is entirely different. There are a myriad
of federal and state laws that give employees substantive rights and
protections-protections for whistle-blowers, protection against racial and
gender discrimination, rights to be free of lie-detector tests, rights to be free of
sexual harassment, rights to a safe and healthy workplace, and protection
against unjust dismissal through various modifications of the at-will rule, and
so forth.7 In addition, the rights guaranteed by section 7 of the NLRA have
been given meaning over the course of sixty years as the National Labor Rela-
tions Board has interpreted and applied the sparse, broad words of the NLRA.
So one might conclude that today's workers reap the benefits of labor's strug-
gles in the nineteenth and early twentieth century-they have government
protection for unions, a statutory framework to ensure them rights to bargain
collectively and to strike, and legislative guarantees of job security, safe work-
ing conditions, pension protection, and dignity on the job.
In recent years, however, a new trend has emerged that threatens to turn
back the clock on workers' rights. This trend is found in legal doctrines and
judicial opinions that require workers to assert their statutory rights in the
forum of private arbitration. These developments prevent workers from vindi-
cating their statutory rights in a public tribunal. At the same time, employers
are using arbitration clauses as a new-found weapon to escape burdensome
employment regulations.
The trend toward mandatory arbitration of statutory rights is evident in
two areas of law, affecting unionized and nonunion employees respectively.
First, by means of an expansive interpretation of section 301 preemption,
courts generally dismiss suits brought by unionized workers under state
employment laws on the grounds that they must take such claims to arbitra-
tion. Second, in the wake of the 1991 Supreme Court decision Gilmer v.
1920s, this began to change. In Schlesinger v. Quinto, 194 N.Y.S. 401 (Sup. Ct. 1922), the New
York Appellate Division held that a union was entitled to an injunction against an employers'
association to prevent a breach of its collective agreement. Over the next ten years, some states
followed the New York rule. See, e.g., Weber v. Nasser, 292 P. 637 (Cal. 1930); Mississippi The-
aters Corp. v. Hattiesburg Local Union, 164 So. 887 (Miss. 1936); Harper v. Local Union No.
520, 48 S.W.2d 1033 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Postwar Paradigm
in American Labor Law, 90 YALE L.J. 1509, 1518-21 (1981).
5. Three years earlier, Congress enacted the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (cod-
ified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1995)), which declared it to be the public policy of the United
States to support collective bargaining. However, the Norris-LaGuardia Act only gave rhetorical
support to worker organizing and collective action; it did not create a general right to organize.
The Act's substantive provisions prevented courts from issuing injunctions in labor disputes and
rendered yellow dog contracts unenforceable.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1995), as initially enacted in 1935, states: "Employees shall have the
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid or protection."
7. See generally Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Ten-
sion Between Individual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59
U. Cm. L. REv. 575, 591-93 (1992) (citing examples).
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Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,8 courts are requiring nonunion workers to sub-
mit claims based on federal and state employment laws to private arbitration
rather than to a court. Further, some courts are beginning to merge these two
doctrinal areas, thereby requiring unionized and nonunion workers to arbitrate
state and federal statutory rights under the FAA.
In this article, I describe and analyze the trend toward mandatory arbitra-
tion of statutory employment rights. I demonstrate that the trend threatens to
deprive workers of their statutory rights altogether. Further, in the nonunion
setting, I show that mandatory arbitration is often imposed as a condition of
employment, without any consent or bargaining. Thus, mandatory arbitration
agreements operate as the new yellow dog contracts of the 1990s. I argue that
courts should not permit workers to waive their rights under state or federal
employment statutes. That is, courts should not force parties to arbitrate statu-
tory claims, should not presume that promises to arbitrate include promises to
arbitrate statutory claims, and should not give arbitral rulings on statutory
issues preclusive effect. To do otherwise threatens to nullify the past sixty
years' development of workers' rights and will make it difficult to legislate
effective worker protection in the future.
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF-THE ROLE OF ARBITRATION UNDER THE
. COLLECTIVE BARGAINING SYSTEM
Today, arbitration and collective bargaining are usually assumed to be
coterminous, if not synonymous, institutions. It is usually assumed that all
collective agreements contain arbitration procedures and that all disputes aris-
ing under the agreements are amenable to arbitration. However, arbitration has
not always been such a prominent feature of our collective bargaining system.
From the 1900s until the 1930s, enforcement of collective bargaining agree-
ments was generally left to the vicissitudes of moral suasion and economic
power.9 Beginning in the 1920s, a few state courts permitted workers or
unions to enforce collective bargaining agreements as ordinary contracts. 0 At
that time, it was not common for collective agreements to contain provisions
for arbitration. Where such arbitration provisions existed, parties could easily
avoid them, given the historical disinclination of common law courts to en-
force executory agreements to arbitrate."
During World War II, the attitude of courts and unions toward arbitration
began to change. The War Labor Board (WLB) regarded arbitration as a sub-
stitute for industrial warfare and thus they found it to be a helpful system for
securing wartime no-strike pledges. To this end, the WLB made arbitration the
preferred method for resolving workplace disputes. It encouraged parties to
8. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
9. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rethinking Labor Voluntarism: Legal Personality, the
Enforcement of Trade Agreements, and the AFL's Attitude Toward the State in the Progressive
Era 26-29 (Oct. 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
10. See Stone, supra note 4, at 1519-21.
11. See Kulukundis Shipping v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942); Julius
H. Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitratiorz Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265 (1926).
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engage in collective bargaining and to include arbitration clauses in their
agreements, and it accorded arbitration promises substantial deference.2
After the War, Congress enacted section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act (LMRA), which said that "suits for violation of contracts be-
tween an employer and a labor organization ... may be brought in any district
court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to
the amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the par-
ties."" On its face, this provision appeared to give federal courts jurisdiction
to hear and decide labor disputes. In the next ten years, some scholars and
practitioners in the labor field urged the courts to interpret section 301 in a
manner that respected the special role of arbitration in resolving contractual
disputes. 4 Justice Douglas adopted this position in 1957 in Textile Workers
Union v. Lincoln Mills,5 where he called upon federal courts to develop a
"federal common law of collective bargaining," the centerpiece of which was
support for and deference to private arbitration.
Since Lincoln Mills, private arbitration has become the central feature of
our collective bargaining system. In 1960, in three cases known as the
Steelworkers' Trilogy, the Supreme Court adopted a set of legal doctrines that
have defined a privileged role for arbitration within our collective bargaining
system. First, the Supreme Court held that courts should grant specific en-
forcement of promises to arbitrate without regard to the merits of the underly-
ing dispute. Thus it held that parties who agree to arbitration provisions can be
required to arbitrate meritless, or even frivolous, claims.' 6 It further held that
agreements to arbitrate were not only judicially enforceable but were enforce-
able on the basis of a presumption of arbitrability. 7 And finally, the Court
held that arbitral awards are enforceable with a minimum amount of judicial
review. 8
In 1964, the Court further defined the privileged status of arbitration by
holding that in cases involving rights arising both under the National Labor
Relations Act and from a collective bargaining agreement, it was appropriate
for the Labor Board to give deference to arbitration over judicial or
administrative mechanisms for resolving the disputes. 9 And in 1970, the Su-
preme Court approved the use of labor injunctions against strikes over issues
that are subject to arbitration agreements,' thereby making a wide exception
12. See James Atleson, Labor and the Wartime State: The Continuing Impact of Labor Rela-
tions During World War II 97-103 (Oct. 1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1995).
14. See, e.g., Archibald Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30
ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 247 (1958) [hereinafter Cox, Problems); Archibald Cox, The Legal Nature
of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MicH. L. REV. 1 (1958) [hereinafter Cox, Legal Nature];
Archibald Cox, Reflections upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REv. 1482 (1959) [hereinafter
Cox, Reflections]; Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 72 HARV. L.
REV. 999 (1955).
15. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
16. United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
17. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
18. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
19. Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
20. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
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to the venerable Norris-LaGuardia Act.2' The cases that proclaimed these la-
bor law rules are well-known fixtures of our collective bargaining system.
Together they make private arbitration the central and distinctive feature of
our collective bargaining system.
In the past two decades, in two different but parallel developments, courts
have expanded the use of labor arbitration even further. While the previous
Supreme Court cases supported broad deference to arbitration to resolve
unionized workers' contractual disputes-i.e., disputes concerning the interpre-
tation and enforcement of collective agreements---courts are now insisting that
arbitration be used to resolve statutory disputes-alleged violations of work-
ers' statutory rights. These developments are found in the section 301 preemp-
tion doctrine for unionized workers, and in the post-Gilmer deferral doctrine
for nonunionized workers.2 Both developments threaten to nullify present
and future legislative efforts to protect workers.
III. MANDATORY ARBITRATION OF UNIONIZED WORKERS' STATUTORY
CLAIMS
In the past fifteen years, courts have given section 301 of the Labor Man-
agement Relations Act a broad application and an expansive, preemptive
scope. The section 301 preemption doctrine says that a unionized worker must
utilize her grievance procedure to resolve all disputes that involve enforcement
of her collective bargaining agreement. 3 Even if the case is brought solely as
a state law action, it is converted into a section 301 case if it is found to be a
de facto effort to enforce a collective bargaining agreement. Today, section
301 preemption has become so extensive that most unionized workers' law-
suits to enforce state law employment rights are automatically dismissed.
The exceptional breadth of section 301 preemption has its origins in a
1968 case, Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735.4 There the Supreme Court
held that a lawsuit which a plaintiff brought solely on the basis of a state-
created entitlement was a section 301 action because the defendant raised a
contractual issue in its defense.2" Avco established an exception to the well-
pleaded complaint rule which "makes the plaintiff the master of the claim" by
allowing the plaintiff to avoid federal jurisdiction by relying exclusively on
state law.26 The Avco Court refused to apply the general rule to labor cases
and instead created the "complete preemption corollary to the well-pleaded
21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1995).
22. In addition, the scope of arbitration has been expanded under the Board's own deferral
rules. In Hammontree v. NLRB, 894 F.2d 438 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the Board applied its pre-arbitral
deferral doctrine to an 8(a)(3) case even though the plaintiff only alleged violations of the NLRA,
not contractual violations. Id. A D.C. Circuit panel ruled that deferral was inappropriate, but on
rehearing, the Circuit sided with the Board, holding that the Board's expansion of deferral was a
reasonable construction of the NLRA. Hammontree v. NLRB, 925 F.2d 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en
banc).
23. Stone, supra note 7, at 594-96.
24. 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
25. Avco Corp., 390 U.S. at 557.
26. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
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complaint rule."" This corollary means that an action that asserts a state law
right but which arguably involves enforcement of a collective bargaining
agreement, is converted into a section 301 claim and may therefore be
removed to a federal court where federal law will apply.2 The jurisdictional
transformation attaches even if the plaintiff deliberately fails to rely on any
rights she might have under her collective bargaining agreement.' As the
Court explained: "[Tihe preemptive force of section 301 is so powerful as to
displace entirely any state cause of action 'for violation of contracts between
an employer and a labor organization.' Any such suit is purely a creature of
federal laws .... 30 Further, even where a plaintiff's case-in-chief rests on
adequate state law grounds and does not rely on a collective bargaining
agreement, the court will permit removal to a federal court, apply federal law
under section 301, and hold that the claim is preempted if the defendant-
employer raises an issue involving the collective bargaining agreement in
defense. 3'
In 1985, the Supreme Court began to define when it will find a suit
brought under state law to be "federalized," and thus preempted. In Allis-
Chalmers v. Leuck,12 the Court held that a state law employment claim whose
disposition is "substantially dependent upon" or "inextricably intertwined with"
a collective bargaining agreement is preempted. 3  Further, the Court held that
section 301 preemption applies to suits in tort as well as those alleging con-
tractual violations.3 ' By extension, complete preemption under section 301 is
also applied in suits arising under state statutory law.35 Thus, as the Supreme
Court recently recognized, section 301 has been "accorded unusual preemptive
power.
36
When a suit is preempted under section 301, there are two practical con-
sequences. First, once a state employment law claim is converted into a sec-
tion 301 claim, it must be resolved through private arbitration. This follows
from the logic of the Steelworkers' Trilogy cases discussed above, in which
the Supreme Court adopted the position that all claims for breach of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement should be decided in private arbitration rather than
by a court.37 And in arbitration, there is virtually no right of judicial re-
27. Id. at 393.
28. Avco Corp., 390 U.S. at 559-60.
29. Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 394-95.
30. Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983).
31. See Stone, supra note 7, at 596-604.
32. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
33. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 212, 220.
34. Id. at 210.
35. See, e.g., Atchley v. Heritage Cable Vision Assocs., 904 F. Supp. 870 (N.D. Ind. 1995)
(claims under state wage payment statute preempted by § 301); see also Burgos v. Executive Air
Inc., 914 F. Supp. 792 (D.P.R. 1996) (claims under Puerto Rico's wage and hour law preempted
by the RLA).
36. Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 122 n.16 (1994).
37. Del Costello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 163 (1983); Clayton v.
UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 681 (1981); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965) ("As
a general rule in cases to which federal law applies, federal labor policy requires that individual
employees wishing to assert contractual grievances must attempt use of the contract grievance
procedure agreed upon by employer and union as the mode of redress.").
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view.38 Thus, once a claim is preempted under section 301, the worker's only
and final recourse is to private arbitration.39 As a result, unionized workers
find that by virtue of the section 301 preemption rules, they do not have ac-
cess to any court to assert their state law claims.
Second, and perhaps more significantly, when a claim is preempted under
section 301, the worker's state law rights are extinguished. In arbitration, the
arbitrator must apply the law of the collective bargaining agreement, not the
external state law which was the basis of the original lawsuit. Thus the union-
ized worker whose state law claim is preempted receives neither the benefit of
a judicial forum nor the benefit of the substantive provisions of the state law.
Section 301 preemption has become a central feature of employment liti-
gation in recent years. Since the mid-1970s, when state courts and legislatures
began to create extensive rights for individual employees, there have been
thousands of cases in which unionized workers tried to take advantage of the
new employment rights. Their fate in the state courts depends on the federal
courts' approach to section 301 preemption.
Under the Allis-Chalmers standard, a state law claim is preempted when it
is "substantially dependent" upon an interpretation of a collective agree-
ment.' Lower courts have differed as to when they will find a state law
claim to be "substantially dependent" on a collective agreement.4 In 1988, in
Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc.,"' the Supreme Court reiterated,
and slightly revised, the Allis-Chalmers contract-dependency standard. It said
that a suit is preempted "if the resolution of a state-law claim depends upon
the meaning of a collective bargaining agreement." '43 The Lingle Court held
that an employee's state law action alleging that she had been fired in retalia-
tion for filing a workers' compensation claim was not preempted, even though
the employee could have brought a grievance under the "just cause" clause in
her collective agreement." In so doing, the Court rejected the argument that a
38. The grounds for vacating an arbitral award under § 301 are extremely narrow. An award
may only be vacated when it fails to "draw[] its essence" from the collective agreement. United
Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). And because there is no
obligation for an arbitrator to give a written opinion, a reviewing court attempting to determine
from whence an award "draws its essence" must enforce an award if it could have drawn its es-
sence from the collective agreement. "Mere ambiguity" is not grounds to refuse enforcement. Id.
at 598.
39. The only exception is if the union fails to bring a case to arbitration, or handles a case
ineptly at arbitration, as a result of a breach of its duty of fair representation. Hines v. Anchor
Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 564 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 187-88 (1967). This
is a narrow exception because a union only breaches its duty if its action or inaction is "arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in bad faith." Id. at 190. Mere negligence by a union does not constitute a
breach of its duty of fair representation. United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 372-73
(1990).
40. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 220.
41. See generally Laura W. Stein, Preserving Unionized Employees' Individual Employment
Rights: An Argument Against Section 301 Preemption, 17 BERKELEY J. EMPtoYMENT & LAB. L.
1, 11-17 (1996) (discussing several tests lower courts have used to define the scope of § 301 pre-
emption under Allis-Chalmers).
42. 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
43. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 405-06.
44. Id. at 407.
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suit is preempted if the state law claim involves the same operative facts as a
claim arising under the collective agreement.45
After Lingle, many federal courts developed a free-wheeling approach to
section 301 preemption. In 1991, the Ninth Circuit described the state of
section 301 preemption law as a "thicket... [a] tangled and confusing inter-
play between federal and state law,"' and "one of the most confused areas of
federal court litigation."47 As of 1992, the result of this "thicket" was that
lower courts were finding preemption in the vast majority of employment
cases brought by unionized workers.
In 1992, this author surveyed hundreds of section 301 preemption cases
and found an astonishingly simple pattern: when unionized workers attempted
to exercise state employment rights, they were not able to do so.' Rather, by
virtue of the preemption rules, the courthouse door was closed. For example,
courts routinely dismissed, on 'preemption grounds, suits for wrongful
dismissal or breach of a promise of job security.49 In addition, courts routine-
ly dismissed claims of unlawful drug testing, claims of defamation by an
employer's derogatory remarks, claims that an employer conducted an unlaw-
ful search of a person or automobile, claims concerning the mishandling of
health insurance, medical leave, or other medical obligations, and claims that
an employer breached a promise to an employee who was in a bargaining
unit.5" Indeed, very few cases brought by unionized workers survived dis-
missal for preemption, and those that did fell into a small number of narrowly-
honed exceptions.5
An example of a typical section 301 preemption case is Jackson v. Liquid
Carbonic Corp.52 The plaintiff, a union member, was dismissed for failure to
pass an employer-administered drug test. He sued on the basis of a state statu-
tory and constitutional right to privacy. 3 The employer removed the case to
federal court and won a dismissal on preemption grounds.54 Affirming this
ruling, the First Circuit reasoned that in order to decide if the employee's
privacy had been violated, it had to determine whether the employer's drug
testing program was "reasonable."55 Further, it said, reasonableness had to be
assessed in light of the right management had, under the collective agreement,
to post reasonable rules and regulations.56 Thus the court concluded that the
suit involved interpretation of the collective agreement, and was therefore pre-
empted.57
45. See Stone, supra note 7, at 603.
46. Galvez v. Kuhn, 933 F.2d 773, 774 (9th Cir. 1991).
47. Id. at 776.
48. These results, with supporting authority, are discussed more fully in The Legacy of In-
dustrial Pluralism, Stone, supra note 7, at 605-20.
49. Id. at 607.
50. Id. at 607-08.
51. Id. at 608-10.
52. 863 F.2d !11 (lst Cir. 1988).
53. Jackson, 863 F.2d at 113.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 118.
56. Id. at 119.
57. Id. at 113.
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In a similar fashion, the great majority of union members' cases alleging
violations of state law brought in the 1980s and early 1990s were found to be
preempted by section 301. In that period, federal courts applied section 301
preemption with extraordinary reach, finding all kinds of lawsuits to be de
facto efforts to enforce collective bargaining agreements. Indeed, some courts
in the 1980s and early 1990s developed a de facto presumption to preempt all
cases in which a unionized worker attempted to assert a state employment
right. For example, in a 1991 decision, the Ninth Circuit stated that in a
unionized workplace, claims about any working conditions that were within
the scope of collective bargaining would be preempted."8 Similarly, the Sixth
Circuit found an employee's claim preempted because, while not entailing in-
terpretation of a collective agreement, it "address[ed] relationships that have
been created through the collective bargaining process."'5 9
In 1994, in two cases decided one week apart, the Supreme Court
revisited the issue of the scope of section 301 preemption. In doing so, it
reined in some of the more expansive approaches that the courts of appeals
had been taking. The first case was Livadas v. Bradshaw,' which concerned
a California law that requires employers to pay all wages due a discharged
employee immediately upon discharge.6 The California Commissioner of La-
bor had a policy of pursuing late wage payment claims of nonunion workers
while refusing to pursue such claims of unionized workers. Livadas, a dis-
charged worker who was not promptly paid her wage claim, challenged the
Commissioner's policy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a violation of her federal
right to engage in collective bargaining. She alleged that the policy "placed a
penalty on the exercise of her statutory right to bargain collectively with her
employer."62 The Commissioner defended the policy on the grounds that it
was compelled by section 301 preemption because disposition of the plaintiff's
wage penalty claim would require determining the amount she was owed, and
this in turn would involve interpreting her collective bargaining agreement. 3
The district court agreed with the plaintiff and enjoined the Commissioner's
policy of refusing to enforce wage-and-hour regulations for unionized work-
ers.'4 A divided Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, stating that
whether or not the plaintiff's claims were actually preempted, state officials
should err on the side of avoiding interference with contractual grievance and
arbitration procedures.6'
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, rejected the
Commissioner's defense, and found him in violation of the plaintiff's federal
rights. In doing so, it stated that there was not even a "colorable argument"
58. Schlacter-Jones v. General Tel., 936 F.2d 435, 441 (9th Cir. 1991).
59. Jones v. General Motors Corp., 939 F.2d 380, 382 (6th Cir. 1991).
60. 512 U.S. 107 (1994).
61. Livadas, 512 U.S. at 110. The law imposes financial penalties, enforceable by the Com-
missioner, on employers who fail to comply. Id.
62. Id. at 113-14.
63. Id. at 118-20.
64. Id. at 114-15.
65. Livadas v. Aubry, 987 F.2d 552, 570 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd sub nor. Livadas v.
Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994).
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that Livadas's claim for late wages was preempted under section 301. The
Court reasoned:
[Tihe primary text for deciding whether Livadas was entitled to a
[late payment] penalty was not the Food Store contract, but a calen-
dar. The only issue raised by Livadas's claim, whether Safeway
"willfully failed to pay" her wages promptly upon severance ... was
a question of state law, entirely independent of any understanding
embodied in the collective-bargaining agreement between the union
and the employer.'
While the Livadas Court found the plaintiff's claim not preempted, it
declined the opportunity to articulate a test for defining the scope of section
301 preemption. Instead, in a footnote, the Court noted that there was a con-
flict between the circuit courts as to the proper breadth of section 301 preemp-
tion. But, the Court said, because the non-preempted status of the plaintiff's
claim was "clear beyond peradventure," this case was "not a fit occasion for
us to resolve disagreements that have arisen over the proper scope of our earli-
er [section 301 preemption] decisions.' 7
Exactly a week later, the Supreme Court did revisit its preemption deci-
sions, but in the context of the Railway Labor Act (RLA) rather than section
301 of the Labor Management Relations Act. In Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v.
Norris,' an airline mechanic was fired for refusing to certify a repair as sat-
isfactorily completed on an airplane maintenance record.' The employee
brought suit in the Hawaii state court on state common law and statutory
wrongful discharge theories." The airline claimed that the suit was in reality
a grievance under the "just cause" provision of the collective agreement, and it




The Court rejected the airlines' preemption argument. It stated that the
standard for preemption under the RLA was "virtually identical" to the stan-
dard under section 301.72 It then noted that the facts of the case were
"remarkably similar" to those in Lingle, where the plaintiff alleged she was
fired in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim.73 Here the em-
ployee alleged he was fired for refusing to sign off on the maintenance record
that violated airline safety and health regulations. The Court said that in both
cases, the state law retaliatory discharge claim turned on a "purely factual
question: whether the employee was discharged . . . , and, if so, whether the
employer's motive in discharging him was to deter or interfere with his exer-
cise of [state law] rights." '74 The Court said that this question could be re-
66. Livadas, 512 U.S. at 124-25.
67. Id. at 124 & n.18.
68. 512 U.S. 246 (1994).
69. Hawaiian Airlines, 512 U.S. at 247.
70. Id. at 248.
71. Id. at 265.
72. Id. at 260.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 262.
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solved without reference to the collective agreement. 75 Reiterating the Lingle
standard, the Hawaiian Airlines Court held that preemption was required when
the employee's state-law claim "is dependent on the interpretation of a CBA
[collective-bargaining agreement]" and that here the plaintiff's claims were not
preempted.76
The 1994 Supreme Court decisions restricted some of the more free-
wheeling approaches to preemption taken by the courts of appeals. No longer
do courts preempt simply on the grounds that an employee is covered by a
collective bargaining agreement." However, since Livadas and Hawaiian
Airines, the lower federal courts continue to preempt most unionized workers'
claims of unjust dismissal,78 promissory estoppel, 79 and breach of contract
concerning employment issues.8" But certain claims are less likely to be pre-
empted since the 1994 decisions. In particular, claims of defamation,8 inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress,82 fraud,83 and battery84 are no longer
routinely preempted. And, as before the 1994 cases, employees' claims of
discrimination or workers' compensation retaliation are generally not
preempted. 5
Despite some constriction of the lower courts' use of preemption since the
Livadas and Hawaiian Airlines decisions, courts nonetheless stretch to find
unionized workers' state law claims preempted. This is especially true for
cases in which a worker challenges her dismissal. For example, in Thomas v.
LTV Corp.,8 6 a case decided after Livadas and Hawaiian Airlines, a unionized
employee negotiated an individual attendance agreement with his employer.87
When he was fired for absenteeism that resulted from an on-the-job injury, he
sued for breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, wrong-
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Cf Jones v. General Motors Corp., 939 F.2d 380, 382 (6th Cir. 1991); Schlacter-Jones v.
General Tel., 936 F.2d 435, 441 (9th Cir. 1991).
78. See, e.g., Thomas v. LTV Corp., 39 F.3d 611, 621 (5th Cir. 1994); Cullen v. E.H.
Friedrich Co., 910 F. Supp. 815, 823 (D. Mass. 1995); Sirois v. Business Express, Inc., 906 F.
Supp. 722, 728-29 (D.N.H. 1995) (RLA preemption).
79. See, e.g., Thomas, 39 F.3d at 619; Cullen, 910 F. Supp. at 824.
80. See, e.g., Thomas, 39 F.3d at 619; Sirois, 906 F. Supp. at 729; Atchley v. Heritage Cable
Vision Assocs., 904 F. Supp. 870, 876 (N.D. Ind. 1995); Knox v. Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel, 899
F. Supp. 1529, 1534 (N.D. W. Va. 1995); Gregory v. Southern New England Tel. Co., 896 F.
Supp. 78, 83 (D. Conn. 1994).
81. See, e.g., Luecke v. Schnucks Mkts. Inc., 85 F.3d 356 (8th Cit. 1996) (holding defama-
tion claims not preempted under § 301); Gay v. Carlson, 60 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cit. 1995) (holding
libel, slander, and prima facie tort claims not preempted under RLA).
82. See, e.g., Trans-Penn Wax v. McCandless, 50 F.3d 217, 232 (3d Cir. 1995); Gregory,
896 F. Supp. at 84.
83. See Trans-Penn Wax, 50 F.3d at 232.
84. See, e.g., Gregory, 896 F. Supp. at 83; Mack v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 878 F.
Supp. 673, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
85. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations, 38 F.3d
1392, 1402 (4th Cir. 1994) (state handicap discrimination claims not preempted under § 301);
Westbrook v. Sky Chefs, Inc., 35 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1994) (workers' compensation retalia-
tion claim not preempted under RLA).
86. 39 F.3d 611 (5th Cir. 1994).
87. Thomas, 39 F.3d at 614.
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ful dismissal, and retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim."8 The
Fifth Circuit said that even assuming the individual agreement was indepen-
dent of the collective bargaining agreement, all the claims were nonetheless
preempted. It noted that the employee's individual agreement sought to limit
or condition his terms of employment, terms which were also addressed by the
collective agreement. On this basis, it found that the individual agreement was
subject to preemption. 9
So long as courts continue to find most unionized workers' state unlawful
dismissal claims preempted, organized workers will have, in some respects,
less employment rights than their unionized counterparts. One might ask, how-
ever, what's wrong with a broad section 301 preemption doctrine that leaves
unionized workers with their right to private arbitration? The answer is that
when a case is preempted under section 301, the law converts the unionized
worker's statutory claim into a claim arising under her collective bargaining
agreement. The arbitrator's task is to apply the collective agreement, not the
relevant statute. Thus, in section 301 arbitration, unionized workers lose their
statutory rights. This would not be a problem if unions were able to secure
strong contractual protections for their members. However, after years of con-
cession bargaining, judicial restrictions on the scope of mandatory bargaining,
and employer use of striker replacements, unions have seen their bargaining
strength erode.' As a result, their collective bargaining agreements have be-
come weaker and weaker. In fact, it is precisely because employment law
statutes seem to provide workers with stronger protections and better remedies
than those contained in their collective bargaining agreements that unionized
workers frequently bring legal actions on the basis of their statutory rights
rather than rely on grievances to assert their contractual rights. Yet the law of
section 301 preemption says that in such cases, the unionized worker is out of
luck.91
In addition to using an expansive section 301 preemption doctrine to
deprive unionized workers of their state law employment rights, some courts
have developed another approach that similarly prevents workers from chal-
lenging dismissals on state law grounds. The First Circuit has concluded that
state common law modifications of the at-will rule do not apply to unionized
workers. As it was explained by Federal District Court Judge Ponsor of
Massachusetts:
88. Id. at 615.
89. Id. at 618. In dicta, the court stated that it believed that the individual agreement "techni-
cally qualifies as a CBA" because the union played a role in helping the employee negotiate it and
because it resulted from disciplinary action. Id.
90. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure, 55 U. CHi. L. REV. 73,
74-76, 86-96 (1988).
91. Judge Alex Kosinski, in his dissent in the Ninth Circuit's opinion in the Livadas case,
decried the court's expansive interpretation of § 301 preemption, calling it the "novel doctrine of
quasi-preemption." Livadas, 987 F.2d at 561 (Kosinski, J., dissenting). He pointed out that the
doctrine has the effect of depriving unionized workers of the benefits of state law employment
rights and placing them at a disadvantage vis-A-vis nonunion workers. Id. at 563. He even hypo-
thesized that the courts' expansion of § 301 preemption and the consequent application of labor
arbitration to unionized workers' statutory claims has contributed to union decline. Id. at 563 n.2;
see also Stone, supra note 7, at 578-84.
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The Massachusetts cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation
of public policy is a judicially created exception to the "employment
at will doctrine." This doctrine holds that an employee, who works
without the benefit of an employment contract, may be discharged for
almost any reason with or without cause. The cause of action,
however, is only available to "at-will" employees. Allowing employ-
ees governed by a CBA [collective bargaining agreement] to assert an
independent, common law claim of wrongful discharge would not be
"a commendable practice. It would deprive employer and union of the
ability to establish a uniform and exclusive method for orderly settle-
ment of employee grievances.'92
Several courts in Rhode Island and New Hampshire have utilized this same
reasoning.93 By limiting application of judicially created exceptions to the at-
will rule to nonunion workers, these courts preclude claims of unjust dismissal
brought by unionized workers, notwithstanding which the standard of section
301 preemption would otherwise be applied. Thus courts are developing a
variety of techniques to keep unjust dismissal claims out of court and restrict
unionized workers to their contractual grievance procedures.
IV. THE GROWTH OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION IN THE NONUNION SECTOR
A. The Gilmer Decision
The second legal development that has expanded arbitration into the realm
of statutory employment rights addresses the use of arbitration by nonunion
employers. In 1991, the Supreme Court decided the case of Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,94 which held that an employee of a stock bro-
kerage firm, who alleged he was fired in violation of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA), had to arbitrate his claim. At the time of hire,
the employee had signed an arbitration clause in a standard stock exchange
registration form, which he was required to file in order to begin work.95 The
Gilmer Court held that the arbitration agreement was enforceable under the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),96 an Act which makes arbitration promises in
contracts involving commerce "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.
97
The Gilmer Court's reasoning was based on a series of recent Supreme
Court cases about commercial arbitration under the FAA. For example, it
quoted its decision in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Con-
struction Corp.,9" in which it had stated that the FAA evidences a "'liberal
92. Cullen, 910 F. Supp. at 821 (citations omitted).
93. See Sirois, 906 F. Supp. at 728; see also Bertrand v. Quincy Mkt. Cold Storage & Ware-
house Co., 728 F.2d 568, 571 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that under Massachusetts law, implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not apply to unionized employees).
94. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
95. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
96. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
97. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
98. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
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federal policy favoring arbitration."' In addition, the Gilmer Court referred
to its holdings in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc."'° and Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,'"' noting that "statu-
tory claims may be the subject of an arbitration agreement, enforceable pursu-
ant to the FAA."" 2 It rejected the plaintiff's arguments that requiring plain-
tiffs to arbitrate ADEA claims was inconsistent with the statutory framework.
In response to the plaintiff's argument that the ADEA embodies important
social policies which should not be determined in private tribunals, the Court
recounted recent cases where it had found that claims arising under the anti-
trust act, the securities act, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act (RICO) are amenable to arbitration under the FAA. °3 The Court
then quoted Mitsubishi to the effect that "so long as the prospective litigant
effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral
forum, the statute will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent func-
tion., o'
The Gilmer Court also rejected, without much discussion, the plaintiff's
arguments that arbitration procedures were inherently inadequate to protect
statutory rights.' 5 Rather, it discussed with approval the particular arbitration
rules of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). For example, the Court noted
that the NYSE Rules required arbitration panel members to disclose their em-
ployment histories and permitted parties to make further inquiries into the
backgrounds of potential arbitrators to discern bias. The NYSE Rules also give
parties one peremptory challenge and unlimited challenges for cause.'" The
Court also noted that the NYSE Rules permit limited discovery, including
document production and depositions.' 7 And the Rules require that arbitral
awards be in writing, specifying the names of the parties, a summary of the
issues, and a description of the award.'" These features of the NYSE arbitra-
tion led the Court to conclude that the arbitration procedures adequately safe-
guarded Gilmer's substantive rights.
Justice Stevens, in dissent, raised what is perhaps the most troublesome
aspect of the Gilmer opinion. Section 1 of the FAA has an exclusion for con-
tracts of employment."° The FAA states that "nothing herein contained shall
apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce."'0 Stevens
argued that the brokerage agreement the plaintiff signed in Gilmer was part of
99. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24).
100. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
101. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
102. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
103. Id. at 27-28.
104. Id. at 28 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 637).
105. Id. at 30-32.
106. Id. at 30.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 31-32.
109. Id. at 36 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
110. 9 U.S.C. § I (emphasis added).
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a contract of employment. ' Because the employer in Gilmer sought to
compel arbitration under the FAA, Stevens maintained that the exclusion for
contracts of employment governed and the Act could not be applied."2
The majority gave short-shrift to Stevens's argument about the contract-
of-employment exclusion. It stated that because the arbitration clause originat-
ed in a contract between the plaintiff and the stock exchange and not in a con-
tract between the plaintiff and his immediate employer, it was not a "contract
of employment" for purposes of the FAA exclusion."3 In addition, the Court
said that because the issue of the section 1 exclusion had not been raised by
the litigants below, nor developed in the record, it was not obliged to address
it in detail. Instead, the Court said, it would leave that issue "for another
day."
14
The Gilmer dissent also took issue with the majority's interpretation of the
FAA exclusion for employment contracts. Stevens argued that Congress had
excluded employment contracts from the FAA out of its concern that arbitra-
tion promises contained in employment contracts were not truly voluntary but
might arise out of excessive inequality of bargaining power."5 These con-
cerns, he argued, should be implemented by giving an expansive interpretation
to the "contract of employment" exclusion and by refusing to apply the FAA
to arbitration of ADEA or other employment-related statutory claims." 6
Stevens also argued that the Court's decision in Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver.7 precluded arbitration of employment discrimination claims. In
Gardner-Denver, the Supreme Court held that an employee who had arbitrated
his discrimination claim under his collective bargaining agreement may, none-
theless, obtain a de novo judicial determination of his Title VII claim. The
Gardner-Denver Court reasoned that a union's collective bargaining agreement
may not waive an employee's individual rights:
Title VII ... concerns not majoritarian processes, but an individual's
right to equal employment opportunities .... Of necessity, the rights
conferred can form no part of the collective bargaining process since
waiver of these rights would defeat the paramount congressional pur-
pose behind Title VII. In these circumstances, an employee's rights
under Title VII are not susceptible of prospective waiver."8
Stevens, in his Gilmer dissent, maintained that Alexander v. Gardner-Den-
ver Co. established the principle that compulsory arbitration conflicts with the
congressional purpose behind anti-discrimination legislation. He quoted Chief
Justice Burger on the issue:
111. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 51-52 & n.2.
114. Id.
115. Id. at39.
116. Id. at 39-43.
117. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
118. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 59-60.
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Plainly, it would not comport with the congressional objectives be-
hind a statute seeking to enforce civil rights protected by Title VII to
allow the very forces that had practiced discrimination to contract
away the right to enforce civil rights in the courts. For federal courts
to defer to arbitral decisions reached by the same combination of
forces that had long perpetuated invidious discrimination would have
made the foxes guardians of the chickens."'
The Gilmer majority distinguished Gardner-Denver on the ground that the
latter involved a unionized worker's claim and an arbitration promise con-
tained in a collective bargaining agreement, thus posing issues about the rela-
tionship between a collective representative and an individual employee's
rights which were not present in Gilmer.
B. Application of Gilmer to Non-Union Workers
Since 1991, most lower federal courts have interpreted Gilmer
expansively. Several federal courts have applied Gilmer to find employees'
discrimination claims arbitrable in cases in which an arbitration promise arose
directly from an employment contract between an employer and an employee,
rather than the third-party arbitration promise involved in Gilmer.' These
cases read the "contracts of employment" exclusion in section I of the FAA
narrowly to apply only to employees involved in the physical movement of
goods across state lines.'2' Some go even further and maintain that the exclu-
sion only applies to transportation workers.' They justify these narrow
readings of the statutory language by saying that the contract-of-employment
exclusion refers explicitly to contracts of employment involving "seamen and
railroad employees," and hence these enumerated categories should limit the
type of employees included in the phrase "any other class of workers."'
23
119. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 750 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
120. See, e.g., Metz v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482 (10th Cir.
1994) (applying Gilmer in employee's Title VII suit alleging pregnancy discrimination); Albert v.
NCR, 874 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (applying Gilmer in an employee's Title VII suit alleg-
ing religious and national origin discrimination); Scott v. Farm Family Life Ins. Co., 827 F. Supp.
76 (D. Mass, 1993) (applying Gilmer to an employee's suit for sex discrimination under Title
VII); DiCrisci v. Lyndon Guaranty Bank, 807 F. Supp. 947 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying Gilmer to
an employee's Title VII suit alleging sexual harassment); see also Crawford v. West Jersey Health
Sys., 64 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 853 (D.N.J. 1994) (applying Gilmer to suit by medical
director against employer for violations of ADEA, Title VII, antidiscrimination statutes, and trade
libel); Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. Bates, 71 F.3d 592 (6th Cir. 1995) (applying Gilmer to deny
injunction against arbitration of contract dispute between employee and employer).
121. The leading case which interpreted the "contracts of employment" exclusion narrowly to
apply only to movement of goods across state lines was Tenney Engineering, Inc. v. United Elec.
Radio & Machine Workers, 207 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1953). While Tenney pre-dated Gilmer, it re-
mains good law in many circuits. See, e.g., Scott v. Farm Family Life Ins. Co., 827 F. Supp. 76
(D. Mass. 1993); Dancu v. Coopers & Lybrand, 778 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (following
Tenney).
122. See, e.g., Miller Brewing Co. v. Brewery Workers Local 9, 739 F.2d 1159 (7th Cir.
1984); Williams v. Katten, Muchin & Zavis, 837 F. Supp. 1430 (N.D. Ill. 1993); DiCrisci v.
Lyndon Guarantee Bank, 807 F. Supp. 947 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
123. Tenney, 207 F.2d at 453. The Tenney court relied on the principle of "'ejusdem generis"
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A few courts, however, have held that the contract-of-employment exclu-
sion applies to all workers engaged in interstate commerce.'24 These courts
argue that the mention of seamen and railroad employees only illustrates the
limited reach of the Commerce Clause in 1925, when the FAA was enacted.
By including the language "any other class of workers engaged in foreign or
interstate commerce," they reason, Congress indicated its intent to except all
workers that were within the reach of the commerce power. While the
lower courts are currently split on this issue, most federal circuit courts are
adopting the former, narrow reading of the contracts-of-employment exclusion.
In addition to applying Gilmer to conventional employment contracts,
many courts have utilized Gilmer's reasoning to mandate arbitration of non-
union employees' claims involving employment-related statutes other than the
ADEA statute that was involved in Gilmer itself. Thus, courts have required
arbitration of claims based on laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of
race,126  sex,127  religion,"' and national origin,"' as well as claims
arising under ERISA 30 and the federal Employee Polygraph Protection
Act.'
3'
C. Application of the FAA to Unionized Workers After Gilmer
Since Gilmer, some courts have questioned whether the holding in
Gardner-Denver-that unionized workers had a right to judicial determination
of discrimination claims despite arbitration provisions in their collective agree-
ments-is still good law. 32 Indeed, some lower courts' decisions effectively
overrule Gardner-Denver. For example, in Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass
Container, Inc.,33 the Fourth Circuit dismissed a gender and handicap dis-
crimination claim brought by a worker who was covered by a collective bar-
gaining agreement, holding that the employee was required to arbitrate, rather
to conclude that the "any other class" language was limited to the narrow categories that preceded
it. Compare Note, The Federal Arbitration Act and Individual Employment Contracts: A Better
Means to an Equally Just End, 93 MICH. L. REv. 2171 (1995) (advocating narrow interpretation
of the exclusion) with Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment Contract Exclusion in
Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the Judiciary's Failure of Statutory Vision,
1991 J. DisP. REsOL. 259, 292-93 (recounting history and reasoning of Tenney interpretation of
"contracts of employment" exclusion and refuting the "ejusdem generis" argument).
124. See Arce v. Cotton Club of Greenville, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 117 (N.D. Miss. 1995);
Mittendorf v. Stone Lumber Co., 874 F. Supp. 292 (D. Or. 1994).
125. See also Matthew Finkin, 'Workers Contracts' Under the United States Arbitration Act:
An Essay in Historical Clarification, 17 BERKELEY J. EMPLOYMENT & LAB. L. 282 (1996).
126. Maye v. Smith, Barney, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
127. Scott v. Farm Family Life Ins. Co., 827 F. Supp. 76 (D. Mass. 1993) (pregnancy dis-
crimination).
128. Williams v. Katten, Muchin & Zavis, 837 F. Supp. 1430 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (race, sex, and
religious discrimination).
129. Albert v. NCR Co., 874 F. Supp. 1328 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (sex, race, and national origin
discrimination).
130. Pritzker v. Merril Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cit. 1993).
131. Saari v. Smith, Barney, Inc., 789 F. Supp. 155 (D.N.J. 1992).
132. See, e.g., Ngheim v. NEC Elec., 25 F.3d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1994); Willis v. Dean-
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305, 308 (6th Cir. 1991).
133. 78 F.3d 875 (4th Cir. 1996).
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than litigate, her claims.'34 It based its reasoning on Gilmer, concluding that
the arbitration clause in the collective bargaining agreement barred judicial
determination of the employee's individual discrimination claims. The court
stated that it assumed that unionized workers were not subject to the FAA, but
it nonetheless held that Gilmer mandated its conclusion. 35 The court also
stated that Gilmer had effectively overruled Gardner-Denver.
36
Despite Fourth Circuit's dicta in Austin to the effect that the FAA does
not apply to unionized workers, its holding that the unionized employee must
arbitrate her federal statutory claims necessarily rests sub silentio on applica-
tion of the FAA. That is because the FAA would provide the only possible
basis for compelling arbitration of a unionized worker's federal statutory
claims. Section 301 preemption is only available to require arbitration of
unionized workers' state law claims.
The circuit courts have been long split on the question whether the FAA
applies to unionized workers.'37 Some hold that the FAA does not apply be-
cause collective bargaining agreements are "contracts of employment" subject
to the section 1 exclusion. As more and more courts reject that view in favor
of the narrow interpretation of the section 1 employment exclusion, they will
also be inclined to apply Gilmer to the unionized sector as the court in Austin
did. Thus the line between FAA arbitration and section 301 preemption is
likely to become blurred.
A recent New Jersey decision similarly blurs the distinction between
FAA-compelled arbitration for nonunion workers and section 301 preemption-
compelled arbitration for union workers. In In re Prudential Insurance Co. of
America Sales Practices Litigation,3 ' New Jersey District Judge Wolin con-
sidered the application of the FAA to a group of employees of an insurance
company who were fired allegedly for refusing to engage in illegal insurance
practices.'39 The employees had been required by their employer to sign the
securities industry standard arbitration clause ("U-4 agreement"). The court
analyzed the case under Gilmer despite the fact that the employees were repre-
sented by a union and covered by a collective bargaining agreement. The court
ultimately decided that the agents were subject to the U-4 arbitration clause,
but rejected the company's motion to compel arbitration on the ground that the
U-4 agreement had an exclusion for disputes involving the insurance busi-
134. Austin, 78 F.3d at 880.
135. Id. at 880-81.
136. Id. at 882.
137. The First, Fourth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the FAA does not apply to
collective bargaining agreements. See, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Asociacion de
Empleados de Casino, 873 F 2d 479 (1st Cir. 1989); Domino Sugar v. Sugar Workers Local 392,
10 F.3d 1064 (4th Cir. 1993); United Food and Commercial Workers v. Safeway, 889 F.2d 940
(10th Cir. 1989); American Postal Workers Union v. USPS, 823 F.2d 466 (11th Cir. 1987). The
Second, Third, and Seventh, on the other hand, have held that it does. See, e.g., I.A.M. v. General
Electric, 406 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969); Newark Stereotypers Union v. Newark Morning News,
397 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1968); Pietro Sclazitti Co. v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, 351
F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1965).
138. 924 F. Supp. 627 (D.N.J. 1996).
139. In re Prudential, 924 F. Supp. at 633.
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ness.'" But by entertaining the company's FAA arguments, the court decid-
ed sub silentio that the FAA applies to employees covered by collective bar-
gaining agreements, at least if the employees are subject to an independent
promise to arbitrate disputes other than one contained in their collective agree-
ment.
As more and more courts apply the FAA to unionized workers' federal
statutory claims, unionized workers will be required to arbitrate not only their
state law employment rights, as they are presently under section 301 preemp-
tion, but also their federal employment claims through such expansive inter-
pretation of Gilmer. Such a move would overrule Alexander v. Gardner-Den-
ver, a position that some management-side labor lawyers have been advocating
for years. 4' It would also make unionized workers' legal claims similar to
those of nonunion workers who, as discussed above, are required to arbitrate
both state and federal employment-related statutory claims. Together these
developments would transform the Supreme Court's commitment to labor
arbitration beyond recognition.
The original justification for judicial deference to arbitration was that
labor arbitrators have a special expertise in applying the "law of the shop,"
which they can bring to bear in the resolution of disputes. 42 It was never
posited that arbitrators have special expertise in interpreting the law of the
land. As Justice Brennan, an avid supporter of labor arbitration for deciding
contractual disputes, warned in 1980, "[B]ecause the specialized competence
of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the
land .... many arbitrators may not be conversant with the public law consid-
erations underlying [statutory claims].'
43
V. THE YELLOW DOG CONTRACTS OF THE 1990S
A. Due Process Deficiencies
While mandatory arbitration of statutory rights is troublesome in any
context, in the nonunion setting it is particularly problematic. Many pre-hire
arbitral agreements are blatant contracts of adhesion. In 1994, the New York
Times reported that more and more employers are requiring their nonunion
employees to agree to boilerplate arbitration agreements as a condition of
employment.'" At the moment of hire, employees lack bargaining power and
are needful of employment, so they frequently agree to such terms without
giving them much thought. In these agreements, employees are typically re-
140. Id. at 641-42.
141. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Center for Public Resources, Inc., in support of Re-
spondent in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., in the Supreme Court of the United States,
filed Dec. 19, 1990, at 14-16 (arguing that Gardner-Denver is based on out-moded views of arbi-
tration, and urging the Court to overrule it). The Center for Public Resources is a non-profit cor-
poration made up of 200 major corporations and 100 law firms engaged in employer-side labor
and employment law. Id. at 1.
142. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
143. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 743 (1981).
144. Steven A. Holmes, Some Workers Lost Right to File Suit for Bias at Work, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 18, 1994, at Al, B-6.
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quired to pay their own legal fees and one-half of the arbitrator's fees, a sum
that could easily exceed $1,000.45 Thus, these Gilmer pre-hire arbitration
agreements discourage workers from asserting statutory rights. They operate
like the early nineteenth century "yellow dog contracts"-contracts in which
employees had to promise not to join a union in order to get a job."
Today's "yellow dog contracts" require employees to waive their statutory
rights in order to obtain employment.'47
Like the yellow dog contracts of the past, the new mandatory arbitration
provisions are often imposed on workers without even the illusion of bargain-
ing or consent. They are designed by employers unilaterally, and given to
employees at the time of hire or inserted in employee handbooks, without
mention of their existence and without discussion as to their terms. A typical
case is Lang v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 4 in which an employer
unilaterally adopted an arbitration policy in 1991, and notified incumbent
employees of its existence by mail. When the plaintiff attempted to bring a
legal action for wrongful termination, the employer moved to dismiss on the
grounds that the dispute must be arbitrated under the company's arbitration
policy. The Court agreed with the employer, holding that by sending employ-
ees the arbitration policy in the mail, the employer had created a binding uni-
lateral contract. It said, "[The plaintiff's] continued employment, with
knowledge of the changed condition, constituted acceptance of the offer and
provided the necessary consideration to bind the parties."'49
The Lang case is not atypical."5 As the U.S. Government's Commission
on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, reported in its May, 1994
Fact-Finding Report:
[Tihe type of pre-dispute arbitration arrangement seen in Gilmer is
devised by employers or their associates and presented to newly-hired
employees on a "take it or leave it" basis. While the labor market
does permit some negotiation and variation in salaries and benefits, it
is hardly likely to let employees insist on litigating, rather than arbi-
trating, future legal disputes with their prospective employers.''
145. Sharona Hoffman, Mandatory Arbitration: Alternative Dispute Resolution or Coercive
Dispute Suppression?, 17 BERKELEY J. EMPLOYMENT & LAB. L. 131, 136-37 & n.26 (1995).
146. "Yellow dog contracts" are employment contracts in which workers promise not to join a
union in order to obtain employment. They were prevalent in the early decades of the twentieth
century and were approved by the Supreme Court in the Hitchman Coal and Coppage cases. See
Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 299 (1917); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1
(1915). After decades of agitation by organized labor, in 1932 Congress declared yellow dog
contracts unenforceable in § 3 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 103 (1988).
147. See Margaret Jacobs, Woman Claims Arbiters of Bias Are Biased, WALL ST. J., Sept. 19,
1994, at BI (reporting that more than 100 major companies have made it a condition of being
hired that an applicant agree to a mandatory arbitration provision of his/her statutory employment
rights).
148. 835 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Minn. 1993).
149. Lang, 835 F. Supp. at 1106.
150. See also Kinnebrew v. Gulf Ins. Co., 67 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 189 (N.D. Tex.
1994) (upholding arbitration policy unilaterally adopted by employer and mailed to incumbent
employees).
151. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR & U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF
THE WORKER-EMPLOYER RELATIONSHIP, FACT-FINDING REPORT 118 (May 1994).
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The problem of lack of consent by nonunion employees to employer-
initiated arbitration systems has been much noted by commentators but little
heeded by courts. In one unusual case, the Ninth Circuit refused to enforce an
arbitration agreement in the securities industry because the agents were not
given an opportunity to read it and it was not explained to them.'52 However,
that decision has been repudiated by most other courts.'53 Indeed, one district
court recently acknowledged that the lack of consent is typical of arbitration
agreements in the securities industry and it found that fact no bar to its en-
forcement. It said:
Even if Smith Barney had explained the scope of the arbitration
clause to the plaintiff, the end result would have been the same; the
execution of a Form U-4 is not unique to Smith Barney employees
and it is not optional. It is an SEC industry-wide requirement, a pre-
requisite to registration with any securities firm.'
5 4
The Center for Public Resources (CPR), an organization devoted to pro-
moting alternative dispute resolution in employment relations, acknowledges
that some courts might find that some arbitration clauses do not give employ-
ees adequate notice of the fact that by signing them, they are waiving some or
all of their statutory employment rights. To cure this potential problem of lack
of knowing waiver and consent, the CPR has proposed language for employers
to use in the introductory paragraph to their written ADR procedures. They
propose the following:
Statement of Consideration and Joint Agreement
IN CONSIDERATION AND AS A MATERIAL CONDITION OF
THE EMPLOYMENT AND CONTINUATION OF EMPLOYMENT
OF THE EMPLOYEE AS OF THE DATE OF THIS EMPLOY-
MENT DISPUTE ARBITRATION PROCEDURE ("Employment Dis-
pute Arbitration Procedure") BECOMES EFFECTIVE, THE EM-
PLOYEE AND THE EMPLOYER (as this term is defined below)
(collectively, the "Parties") AGREE TO SUBMIT FOR RESOLU-
TION PURSUANT TO THIS Employment Dispute Arbitration Proce-
dure ANY EMPLOYMENT DISPUTE (as this term is defined be-
low), AND FURTHER AGREE THAT ARBITRATION PURSUANT
TO THIS Employment Dispute Arbitration Procedure IS THE EX-
CLUSIVE MEANS FOR RESOLUTION OF SUCH DISPUTE AND
THAT BOTH THE EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE HEREBY
WAIVE THEIR RESPECTIVE RIGHTS, IF ANY, TO RESOLVE
ANY DISPUTE THROUGH ANY OTHER MEANS, INCLUDING
A JURY TRIAL OR A COURT TRIAL IN A LAWSUIT, EXCEPT
AS EXPRESSLY PROVIDED IN THIS Employment Dispute Arbi-
tration Procedure.'
152. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994).
153. See e.g., In re Prudential, 924 F. Supp. 627, 642 (D.N.J. 1996).
154. Id. at 642 (quoting Bender v. Smith Barney Upham & Co., Inc., 789 F. Supp. 155, 159
(D.N.J. 1992)).
155. See Jay W. Waks & John Roberti, Challenges to Employment ADR: Processes, Rather
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The virtue of this language, observes the CPR, is that it explains "in a single
sentence that 'All Disputes are subject to this Employment Dispute Arbitra-
tion.""116 The CPR goes on to propose additional language, which:
[Diefines this term broadly with certain limited and clearly stated ex-
ceptions: the term "Dispute," whether in the singular or plural, means
(a) all claims, disputes or issues of which the Employee (including
former Employee) is or should be aware during the employment rela-
tionship or after termination thereof, and which relate to or arise out
of the employment of the Employee by the Employer (including with-
out limitation any claim of constructive termination, any benefits-
related claim or any related claim against an individual employee),
and (b) all Employer counterclaims against that Employee. The term
"Dispute" includes, without limitation, contractual, statutory and com-
mon law claims and excludes statutory claims for workers' compensa-
tion or unemployment insurance, other claims that are expressly ex-
cluded by statute and claims that are expressly required to be
arbitrated under a different procedure pursuant to the terms of an em-
ployee benefit plan. In addition, the term "Dispute" expressly ex-
cludes any claim which relates to or arises out of confidentiality or
noncompetition conditions of employment, trade secrets, intellectual
property or unfair competition.57
The CPR recommendation concludes by saying, "An explication of this nature
should ordinarily provide sufficient protection."'58
The CPR language is about as "sufficient" as the back of a parking lot
ticket stub for conveying knowledge of a waiver of liability. After trying to
imagine a worker without legal training and extraordinary patience reading this
language, one is left to wonder who is getting the protection out of this?
In addition to resting on dubious consent, many nonunion arbitration
agreements require employees to waive their rights to punitive damages, con-
sequential damages, attorneys' fees, injunctive relief, reinstatement, or other
remedies that might be available in court. These are almost always upheld.'59
For example, in Pony Express Courier Corp. v. Morris,"6° an applicant for
employment was given an arbitration agreement to sign, which provided that
all claims relating to her employment shall be arbitrated without discovery and
that any award shall be limited to actual lost wages or six months wages,




159. See, e.g., DeGaetano v. Smith Barney, No. 94-CIV-1613, 1996 WL 44226 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (compelling arbitration of Title VII even though arbitration agreement did not permit
awards of injunctive relief, attorneys' fees, or punitive damages); Kinnebrew v. Gulf Ins., 67 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 189 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (enforcing arbitration agreement that limited dam-
ages to compensation for "direct injury," excluding punitive damages, attorneys' fees, and equita-
ble relief, and placing severe restrictions on possibility of reinstatement).
160. 921 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996).
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whichever is less. The agreement also said that "you will not be offered em-
ployment until it [the arbitration agreement] is signed without modifica-
tion."'' The Texas appeals court upheld this agreement against a challenge
that it was unconscionable.
Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of nonunion arbitration agreements
stems not from the fact that they are contracts of adhesion or that they limit
employees' remedies, but that they often have a systematic pro-employer ef-
fect on the outcomes of disputes. While there is no comprehensive survey data
on the subject (and indeed there cannot be due to the privatized nature of the
tribunals), there is some anecdotal data that suggests that nonunion arbitration
schemes tend to generate pro-employer outcomes. 62 For example, a congres-
sional study found that the overwhelming majority of securities industry arbi-
trators who hear sexual harassment complaints as well as other employment
matters are white males in their sixties who do not have significant experience
or training in labor and employment law. In this setting, women plaintiffs are
not likely to win.'63
In the wake of Gilmer, several organizations have developed model arbi-
tration procedures for nonunion workplaces. One, the "Model Employment
Termination Dispute Resolution Procedure" which was promulgated by the
Center for Public Resources, demonstrates how particular ADR procedures can
have a systematic effect on the outcome of disputes." In the CPR model
ADR procedure, an employee promises to arbitrate all disputes related to or
arising out of the termination of her employment, and it expressly precludes
bringing any such claims in a court. The employee has a short time period,
180 days, to initiate the procedure. 65 All disputes are heard by an Adjudica-
tor. If the parties cannot agree on who the Adjudicator shall be, it is to be
chosen from the commercial arbitration panel of the American Arbitration
Association (AAA), not the labor arbitration panel. The CPR's Official Com-
mentary does not explain why they call for selecting an arbitrator from the
AAA's commercial arbitration panel rather than from the AAA's labor arbitra-
tion panel, yet commercial arbitrators tend not to be lawyers and, unlike the
labor arbitrators, have no familiarity with employee rights or concerns.
The CPR procedure states that for an employee to prevail, she must "dem-
onstrate that the termination was not based on any legitimate business rea-
161. Pony Express, 921 S.W.2d at 819.
162. One survey concludes that employers are more likely to win discrimination cases before
an arbitrator than before a jury, and that those employees who do win, generally receive smaller
awards in arbitration than in jury trials. Stuart Bompey & Michael Pappas, Compulsory Arbitra-
tion in Employment Discrimination Claims: The Impact of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 1993 A.B.A. SEC. ON EMPLOYMENT & LAB. LAW EEO COMM. PAPERS.
163. Steven A. Holmes, Arbitrators of Bias in Securities Industry Have Slight Experience in
Labor Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 1994, at B4.
164. CENTER FOR PUBLIC RESOURCES, MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION DISPUTE RESO-
LUTION PROCEDURE, in Jay W. Waks & Linda M. Gadsby, Arbitration and ADR in the Employ-
ment Area, C879 ALI-ABA MEDIATION AND OTHER ADR METHODS 439 app. at 461 (Nov. 18,
1993) [hereinafter CPR PROCEDURESi.
165. Id. at 470. In contrast, under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, in some circum-
stances employees have 300 days to file suit. 42 U.S.C. § 706 (e)(1).
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son.' " As the CPR's Official Commentary acknowledges, this phrase is an
express waiver of other burdens of proof which might otherwise apply.67
Specifically, this burden of proof makes it more difficult for employees to
prevail in CPR arbitrations than they would under the usual burden in labor
arbitrations, in which the employer typically has the burden of demonstrating
"just cause" for a dismissal. The CPR's burden of proof is also a more oner-
ous burden than the burden of proof under some employment statutes, in
which an employee can win in a mixed motive situation."6 In the CPR pro-
cedures, by contrast, if there is any scintilla of legitimate business reason in-
volved in a dismissed decision, the employer will prevail.
Under the CPR procedures, should an employee win her case, she will
find she has a very limited range of remedies. The rules provide that the Adju-
dicator may grant the remedy of lost wages, less interim income from unem-
ployment benefits, other earnings etc., the expenses of bringing the case to
arbitration, and reinstatement. If reinstatement is not practical "under the cir-
cumstances," the Adjudicator may grant up to two years "front pay" in its
stead. Also, the Adjudicator may grant up to one year's wages in lieu of puni-
tive or other special damages that the employee may be entitled to in a judi-
cial proceeding.'69 No recovery for items such as pain and suffering, conse-
quential damages, or punitive damages are permitted. Thus, a worker who
might otherwise have received a generous award of damages for unjust dis-
missal, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, assault,
defamation, or some other tort in a state court, is limited in CPR to reinstate-
ment, interim lost earnings, and one or two year's wages. 70
B. Agreements to Capitulate
Some federal agencies and courts are beginning to recognize that by en-
forcing mandatory arbitration of statutory rights, they are effectively depriving
employees of their rights altogether. For example, in EEOC v. River Oaks
Imaging & Diagnostic,"' an employer insisted its employees agree to arbi-
tration clauses under which they promised to arbitrate all disputes with the
employer and to pay one-half of the cost of any ADR proceedings.' Two
female employees who refused to sign the employer's arbitration agreement
were fired. The EEOC sought a preliminary injunction against the company's
enforcement of its ADR policy, arguing that the agreement was a violation of
the Civil Rights Act because it required employees, as a condition of employ-
166. CPR PROCEDURES, supra note 164, at 473.
167. Id. at 483.
168. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (on method for determining
mixed motive questions in Title VII disparate treatment case).
169. CPR PROCEDURES, supra note 164, at 475-76.
170. These arbitral monetary remedies are not nearly as generous as some jury awards in
unjust dismissal litigation in state courts, which often reach six figures. See Stone, supra note 7, at
630 & n.225.
171. No. CIV.A.H-95-755, 1995 WL 264003 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
172. For a detailed discussion of the facts of River Oaks Imaging, see Hoffman, supra note
145, at 136-40.
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ment, to promise to refrain from exercising their rights to bring employment
discrimination charges to the EEOC. On April 19, 1995, a district court issued
a preliminary injunction against River Oaks prohibiting the employer from
requiring its employees to submit to "any ADR policy which would cause an
employee to pay the costs of ADR proceedings preclud[ing] or interfer[ing]
with any employee's right to file complaints with the EEOC or to promptly
file suit in a court of law when the employee has complied with the require-
ments of Title VII.""' The case was ultimately settled with a consent order
which voided the River Oaks ADR policy.'74
Another recent case which demonstrates the potential for pre-hire arbitra-
tion agreements to operate as mandatory waivers of statutory rights is
Bentley's Luggage Corp.' There, employees were asked to sign a form stat-
ing that by remaining a Bentley's Luggage employee, they agreed to submit
all employment-related disputes to arbitration before bringing any legal action.
One employee who refused to sign the agreement was fired. The NLRB Gen-
eral Counsel's office issued an unfair labor practice complaint on the theory
that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to fire a worker for refusing
to waive his right to bring an unfair labor practice charge to the Board.'76
Bentley's Luggage was eventually settled, with the employer reinstating
the employee-complainant and posting a notice that it would not require em-
ployees to arbitrate issues that involved rights protected by the NLRA. 77
However, a similar case is still pending at the NLRB. In Great Western Fi-
nancial Corp., an employee who signed a pre-hire arbitration agreement was
fired when she filed an unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB.' In
these cases, the Labor Board, like the EEOC in River Oaks Imaging, has be-
gun to recognize that reliance upon, and deferral to, arbitration has gone too
far.
We can expect cases like these to proliferate. Indeed, Gilmer suggests a
modem revival of the old yellow dog contract. In many states, employers can
get the benefit of Gilmer merely by inserting arbitration clauses into their
employment manuals or by sending incumbent employees a postcard. Thus
even without signing anything, workers can be forced to waive their statutory
rights-rights to be free of employment discrimination, rights to a safe
workplace, rights to form a union-just to get a job.
C. Curtailing Legislative Capacity and Reinventing Substantive Due Process
The increased judicial deference to arbitration to resolve the statutory
claims of nonunion workers and to preclude the statutory claims of unionized
workers makes it exceedingly difficult for legislatures to enact meaningful
173. River Oaks Imaging, 1995 WL 264003, at *1.
174. Hoffman, supra note 145, at 140 & n.48.
175. NLRB Case No. 12-CA-16658, 1995 DAILY LAB. REP. 95 d4 (BNA) (Sept. 25, 1995).
176. Arbitration: Accord Reached on Unfair Labor Practice Case Involving Mandatory Ar-
bitration Pledge, 1996 DAILY LAB. REP. 96 d15 (BNA) (May 17, 1996).
177. Id.
178. NLRB Case No. 12-CA-166886, DAILY LAB. REP. 105 d4 (BNA) (Sept. 25, 1995).
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statutes that give employees protection. Imagine, for example, that courts were
to hold that workers' complaints under the Occupational Safety and Health
Act of 1970 (OSHA) are subject to mandatory arbitration provisions. Such a
result, which is possible under an expansive interpretation of Gilmer, would
vitiate Congress's intent in enacting OSHA in the first place. Congress enacted
OSHA in order to provide uniform standards for employee health and safety.
To subject its provisions to mandatory arbitration would subject unionized as
well as nonunion workers to the variable, unpredictable, and invisible out-
comes of private arbitration.' Further, such a requirement would make it
difficult, if not impossible, for Congress to monitor the effectiveness of its
legislative efforts, or to revise legislation to better address pressing social
problems. In a similar fashion, compelled arbitration of statutory claims threat-
ens to nullify all employee protection legislation. It also makes it impossible
for Congress to enact effective legislation for worker protection because what-
ever is stipulated by statute can be compromised away by employer-designated
arbitrators. In addition, by removing labor cases to private arbitral tribunals,
courts are taking employment concerns out of the public arena, away from
public scrutiny and political accountability. Because the arbitral tribunal is
invisible, no one knows to what extent arbitration enforces these publicly con-
ferred employment rights, if at all.
A related problem with mandatory arbitration of statutory rights is that
statutory disputes are being decided in private tribunals which generate no
publicly available norms to guide actors or decisionmakers in the future. Over
the next five years, we can expect a gradual diminution of litigation in the
discrimination area as employers channel more and more employees' discrimi-
nation complaints into arbitration. This will mean that arbitrators who want to
interpret the statutes correctly will have no authoritative statutory interpreta-
tions to look to for guidance.'80 It 'also means that the law cannot play an
educational role of shaping parties' norms and sense of right and wrong, and
therefore it cannot shape behavior in its shadow.
Furthermore, statutory employment rights are enacted when a legislature
believes that workers cannot adequately protect themselves simply by bargain-
ing with their employers. That is, they reflect a legislature's view of market
failure in the contracting process. Legislatures act to ensure healthy and safe
workplaces, protect privacy on the job, or to provide other protections when
they believe that there is a public policy concern so compelling that it war-
rants intervening in the wage bargain. To then relegate enforcement or inter-
pretation of these employment rights to a privatized tribunal-a tribunal whose
composition and internal rules reflect and instantiate the very power imbal-
ances that gave rise to the need for legislation in the first place-permits,
indeed invites, de facto nullification.
179. See also Martin H. Malin, Arbitrating Statutory Employment Claims in the Aftermath of
Gilmer, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 77, 100 (1996) (employment statutes represent Congress's desire to
enact uniform labor statutes).
180. Arbitrators frequently have no training in the legal issues they are called upon to decide.
See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 163, at B4.
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VI. DUE PROCESS OR COWBOY ARBITRATIONS?
A. Efforts to Reconstruct Due Process in the Private Realm
One could read the Gilmer decision as imposing minimal due process
norms on employment arbitration and thus precluding the spread of lawless,
one-sided "cowboy" arbitration procedures of the sort described above. The
majority opinion in the Gilmer Court noted with approval the due process
protections in effect in the New York Stock Exchange arbitration rules that
were involved in Gilmer's case. The NYSE rules include procedures for
employees to detect and challenge bias in arbitration panels, provisions for
limited discovery by employees, requirements that arbitrators issue written
opinions, and approval for a broad range of remedies, including equitable
relief.' One commentator has argued that Gilmer thus establishes a minimal
set of due process standards by which employment arbitration must be mea-
sured.' Professor Robert Gorman reads Gilmer to say that "Arbitral systems
without the procedural safeguards found in the New York Stock Exchange
would apparently so undermine the enforcement of statutory claims as to be,
in the Court's view, intolerable."'83
Unfortunately, none of the lower courts since Gilmer have read the
Supreme Court opinion in this way. To date, no post-Gilmer lower court has
treated the procedural aspects of the NYSE arbitration rules as a precondition
to enforcing an employment law arbitration. Rather, courts almost universally
uphold mandatory pre-dispute arbitration for statutory claims without any dis-
cussion about the procedures to be utilized in the arbitration itself.
Since Gilmer, some members of the labor-management bar have attempted
to draft their own minimal due process norms for nonunion employment arbi-
tration proceedings. Most notably, a task force composed of representatives of
the Labor & Employment Section of the American Bar Association, the Amer-
ican Arbitration Association, the National Academy of Arbitrators, the Nation-
al Employment Lawyers Association, the American Civil Liberties Union, and
the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution met over a period of
months to develop a set of fair arbitration procedures. Out of this effort came
a document called "A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of
Statutory Disputes Arising Out of the Employment Relationship." The Proto-
col, which was signed in May, 1995, addresses issues such as arbitral bias,
representation of parties, costs of arbitration, discovery, and the form of ar-
bitral awards." 4 The organizations that endorsed the Protocol have taken the
position that they will not participate in any employment arbitrations that do
not satisfy its terms.
181. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-32.
182. Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public-Law
Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REv. 635, 644-45.
183. Id. at 645.
184. Arnold M. Zack, The Evolution of the Employment Protocol, 50 J. DIsP. RESOL. 36, 37-
38 (Oct.-Dec. 1995).
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The Due Process Protocol thus appears to represent a consensus within the
labor-management community about fair procedures for employment arbitra-
tions. However, its protections are extremely limited. The task force did not
achieve consensus on the most important issues concerning nonunion arbitra-
tion: whether to permit pre-dispute arbitration at all, and whether to permit
employers to make agreement to arbitration a condition of employment.'85
Some task force members believed that employees should never be permitted
to waive their right to judicial relief of statutory claims, some believed that
employees should be permitted to waive their right to a judicial forum once a
dispute arises but not ex ante, and some believed that employers should be
able to insist on a pre-dispute agreement to utilize an arbitration proce-
dure.'86 Thus the most controversial aspect of Gilmer arbitrations is not ad-
dressed by the Protocol.'87
To the extent that the Protocol sought to develop "standards of exemplary
due process" for such arbitrations as do occur, it presents at best a bare mini-
mum. It contains few, if any, significant process rights for employees. One
due process protection it does contain is to state that employees should have
the right to be represented by a spokesperson of their own choosing. Another
is that it calls for "limited pretrial discovery" to give employees access to "all
information reasonably relevant to ... arbitration of their claims."'88 Howev-
er, beyond these two specific safeguards, the Protocol gives employees little.
For example, the Protocol calls for the selection of "impartial arbitrators" and
insists arbitrators must be "independent of bias."'89 These are worthy
goals-goals that no one would dispute. But the Protocol may just as well say,
"arbitration procedures should be fair." That too would be beyond reproach
but equally devoid of any guidance about how fairness could be achieved or
what fairness comprises. Without more detail, exhortations for impartiality and
freedom from bias are empty aspirations rather than meaningful protections.
The Protocol says nothing about how to ensure impartiality and lack of
bias." The FAA itself states that "evident partiality" is grounds for a court
to vacate an arbitral award, 9' so the Protocol's language endorsing the idea
of impartiality for arbitrators gives employees no better protection than they
already had.
The Protocol's main achievement is to delegate the most important issues
that arise in arbitration to the arbitrator. For example, it says that the arbitrator
should have the authority to determine the scope of discovery, to rule on evi-
185. Id. at 37.
186. Id.
187. In contrast, the Dunlop Commission took a position on this issue in its Final Report, and
concluded that courts or Congress should "Forbid Making Agreement to Arbitrate Public law
Claims a Condition of Employment at This Time." U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, COMMISSION ON THE
FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 33 (Dec. 1994)
[hereinafter DuNLoP COMMISSION FINAL REPORTI.
188. Zack, supra note 184, at 38.
189. Id. at 38-39.
190. The Protocol does call for the disclosure of conflicts of interest by an arbitrator, but that
too has been a feature of the federal arbitration act for a long time. See Commonwealth Coatings
Corp. v. Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145 (1968).
191. 9 U.S.C. § 10(b) (Supp. 1996).
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deritiary matters, to determine whether post-hearing submissions should be
considered, and decide arbitrability questions.'92 On the issue of expense, the
Protocol is ambiguous. It recommends that employers reimburse employees for
a portion of the employee's attorneys' fees if the employee is low paid, yet it
also calls for employer and employee to share in the costs of the arbitrator, if
at all possible. It leaves the actual allocation of fees, including attorneys' fee
reimbursement, to the arbitrator. 93
The Protocol also devotes considerable attention to the issue of ensuring
arbitrators are knowledgeable about employment statutes. While the existence
of knowledgeable arbitrators would ultimately enure to the benefit of employ-
ees, the Protocol's proposal is extremely weak. The Protocol does not take the
position that only lawyers should conduct arbitrations about statutory
claims-it merely recommends that arbitrators receive training in "substantive,
procedural, and remedial issues to be confronted."'
' 94
Overall, the Protocol proposals will not cure most of the due process
defects in the nonunion arbitrations. Even with the right to representation and
minimum discovery that the Protocol calls for, nonunion employment arbitra-
tions are still designed by employers, heard by whichever arbitrator the em-
ployer selects, and conducted under whatever procedural rules, burdens of
proof, presumptions, limitations periods, and the like that the employer writes
into the procedure.
B. Critical Voices from the Bar, the Labor Movement and the Supreme
Court
There is a significant and growing sentiment in the legal community that
arbitration is an inadequate enforcement mechanism for employees' statutory
rights. Some focus on the procedural deficiencies in the arbitral process, stres-
sing that arbitration is a privately created, do-it-yourself tribunal, which rarely
provides rights to discovery, compulsory process, cross examination, or other
due process protections common to civil trials.'95 Thus, some claim, arbitra-
tion relegates workers to second-class justice.
Other critics focus on the privatization of disputes in arbitration. These
critics argue that arbitral decisions are invisible documents-they do not re-
ceive media attention or public scrutiny and therefore engender no public
debate. Arbitrators are not public officials, not accountable to a larger public,
nor required to apply public law.'96 And there is no legislative arena in
192. Zack, supra note 184, at 39.
193. Id. at 38-39.
194. Id.
195. Stone, supra note 9; see Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 659 (1965)
(Black, J., dissenting).
196. While arbitrators are not accountable to the public, they may be accountable to the repeat
players in the arbitral world-those who pick arbitrators on a regular basis. See Marc Galanter,
Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 1974 LAW &
Soc'Y REv. 95 (on the advantages of repeat players). In the nonunion context, the repeat players
are inevitably the employers.
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which unpopular decisional trends can be challenged. Arbitration is a privat-
ized forum, designed by the parties, and out of the public eye.'97
Some of the voices critical of arbitration of statutory rights come from the
labor movement and the labor relations bar.' For example, in a joint state-
ment to the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations,
several organizations representing working women, including 9 to 5, the
National Association of Working Women, the American Nurses Association,
and the Coalition of Labor Union Women, decried the "alarming trend toward
using mandatory arbitration to reduce employment-related litigation."'"
These groups feared in particular that Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
was being used "as a means of eroding the hard-fought legal protections wom-
en have against inequitable treatment in the workplace ... [especially] in the
area of sexual harassment." 2" They argued that "employers should not be
able to coerce individual workers, particularly women workers who are not
protected by a union, at the onset of an employment relationship or at any
time thereafter, to choose between their statutory rights to be free of discrimi-
nation and their jobs."' '
Marsha Berzon, an attorney who represents the AFL-CIO, pointed out to
the Commission that mandatory ADR to resolve statutory disputes would cir-
cumvent the deterrent effects of litigation-large verdicts and unfavorable
publicity-which are so important in enforcing employment legislation. 2
Berzon also argued that ADR systems are inherently biased without a union.
Even if ADR systems are designed to provide neutral decisionmakers and a
level playing field, they still give the employer an advantage because the em-
ployer is a repeat player in the world of ADR professionals." 3 Berzon also
opines that by relegating important employment issues to private tribunals,
employment law will remain unelaborated, misunderstood, and diminished in
its effectiveness.
0 4
On many occasions, members of the Supreme Court have also recognized
the shortcomings of arbitration of statutory rights. The Court has repeatedly
197. Stone, supra note 4. In addition to its due process failings, arbitration also does not pro-
vide remedies as effective or as generous as those in a judicial forum. For example, most arbi-
trators believe that they do not have the power to award damages for intangible harms, or to
award punitive or consequential damages. In addition, arbitrators almost never grant interest on
back pay awards, even when it is issued months or years after an unjust dismissal. It is common
practice for an arbitrator to award reinstatement but no back pay at all to a worker fired without
just cause. In contrast, prevailing parties in unjust dismissal litigation receive jury awards in the
mid-to-high six figures. Furthermore, most arbitrators do not believe that they have the power to
order provisional relief. Thus many contract violations, such as improper job assignments or safety
matters, can neither be prevented nor remedied after the fact. Stone, supra note 7.
198. See Committee on Labor and Employment Law, Final Report on Model Rules for the
Arbitration of Employment Disputes, 50 RECORD OF THE AssOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY
OF NEW YORK 629, 629-30 (1995).
199. Fact Finding Report, 1994: Hearing Before the Commission on the Future of Worker-
Management Relations, 102d Cong. 24-26 (1994) (statement of 9 to 5).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 5 (statement of Marsha Berzon).
203. Id. at 6-7.
204. Id. at 9-10.
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warned that the second-class procedures of arbitration can lead to second-class
outcomes. For example, the Court stated in 1956, in Bernhardt v. Polygraph
Co. of America:'°S
The nature of the tribunal where suits are tried is an important part of
the parcel of rights behind a cause of action. The change from a court
of law to an arbitration panel may make a radical difference in ulti-
mate result. Arbitration carries no right to trial by jury.... Arbitra-
tors do not have the benefit of judicial instruction on the law; they
need not give their reasons for their results; the record of their pro-
ceedings is not as complete as it is in a court trial; and judicial re-
view of an award is more limited than judicial review of a trial.2' 6
Bernhardt was a nonlabor case arising under the FAA. Justice Douglas, who
wrote these words, spearheaded the Supreme Court's adoption of broad sup-
port for arbitration in labor cases. Douglas wrote the Bernhardt opinion in
1956, one year before he wrote the path-breaking Lincoln Mills opinion calling
upon courts to expand the role of labor arbitration.
Justice Douglas repeated these sentiments in 1974 in another nonlabor
case, Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,2" where he criticized judicial deference
to arbitration of statutory claims. He wrote in dissent:
An arbitral award can be made without explication of reasons and
without development of a record, so that the arbitrator's conception of
our statutory requirement may be absolutely incorrect yet functionally
unreviewable.... The loss of the proper judicial forum carries with
it the loss of substantial rights. 2°8
Similar arguments about the lack of due process in arbitration and the
consequences for the outcomes of disputes have been raised by many Supreme
Court Justices over the past four decades. Justice Black, in his dissent in Re-
public Steel Corp. v. Maddox,2"9 observed:
For the individual, whether his case is settled by a professional arbi-
trator or tried by a jury can make a crucial difference. Arbitration...
carries no right to a jury trial... ; arbitrators need not be instructed
in the law; they are not bound by rules of evidence; they need not
give reasons for their awards; witnesses need not be sworn; the re-
cord of proceedings need not be complete; and judicial review, it has
been held, is extremely limited.1
Justice Reed in his majority opinion in Wilko v. Swan,"' stated that, for
securities cases, it is unlikely that arbitrators will be sufficiently versed in the
law, or have an adequate understanding of statutory requirements such as
"'burden of proof,' 'reasonable care' or 'material fact."' 22 Similarly, Justice
205. 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
206. Bernhardt, 350 U.S. at 203.
207. 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
208. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 532.
209. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
210. Maddox, 379 U.S. at 669 (Black, J., dissenting).
211. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
212. Wilko,'346 U.S. at 436 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1995)). Justice Reed also criticized
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Brennan wrote for the majority in McDonald v. City of West Branch"3 that
"an arbitrator's expertise 'pertains primarily to the law of the shop, not the
law of the land.""'2 4 Justice Powell, writing for the Court in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co.,2 5 said:
[W]e have long recognized that "the choice of forums inevitably af-
fects the scope of the substantive right to be vindicated. .. ."
Respondent's deferral rule is necessarily premised on the assumption
that arbitral processes are commensurate with judicial processes and
that Congress impliedly intended federal courts to defer to arbitral
decisions on Title VII issues. We deem this supposition unlikely.2 6
Similar sentiments have been expressed by Justice Blackmun dissenting in
Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon,"' by Justice Stevens dissent-
ing in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,"'s and by
Justice Harlan concurring in U.S. Bulk Carriers, Inc. v. Arguelles.2"9 Indeed,
even Justice Marshall, writing for the majority in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.
v. Byrd22 -a decision in which the Court approved an expansive interpreta-
tion of the FAA-acknowledged that "arbitration cannot provide an adequate
substitute for a judicial proceeding in protecting the federal statutory and
constitutional rights that section 1983 is designed to safeguard.
'22
1
Thus for over four decades, many Supreme Court Justices have recog-
nized the procedural shortcomings of arbitration and have questioned the wis-
dom and justice of permitting private arbitration to substitute for judicial or
administrative tribunals for resolving statutory disputes. I hope that we could
return to this wisdom now, and reverse the trend toward compulsory arbitra-
tion of statutory employment rights.
VII. CONCLUSION
The state of labor and employment law today stands as a distorted reflec-
tion of that which existed one hundred years ago. In the past, workers had few
workplace rights other than those they could secure and enforce through col-
lective muscle and labor market power. Today, workers have many de jure
rights, but often these rights cannot be enforced due to mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration systems. Further, in many respects, workers have less ability to use
direct action to enforce rights than they once did. Today, labor's use of
the FAA for not providing for "judicial determination of legal issues such as is found in the Eng-
lish law." Id. at 437.
213. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
214. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 288-93 (quoting Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,
57 (1974)).
215. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
216. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 56 (quoting United States Bulk Carriers v. Arguelles, 400
U.S. 351, 359-60 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
217. 482 U.S. 220, 257-60 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting) (arguing that
procedural defects in arbitration render it inadequate to protect investor's rights).
218. 473 U.S. 614, 647 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
219. 400 U.S. 351, 365 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
220. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
221. Byrd, 470 U.S. at 222 (discussing McDonald, 466 U.S. at 284).
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economic weapons is governed by a Byzantine labyrinth of complex and con-
tradictory legal rules, rules which channel disputes into a legalistic maze of
public and private tribunals, at the end of which the worker, exhausted, demor-
alized, and dispirited, finds she has lost whatever rights she once believed
were worth seeking. The result is a bitter irony for the worker-she has more
rights and less protection than ever.
To avoid this descent into labor-management absurdity, we need to con-
sider legislative proposals that would reverse the trend toward privatizing
employment rights. Congress could take action to reverse this trend of exces-
sive use of labor arbitration to resolve disputes over workers' statutory rights.
Specifically, Congress could enact legislation that would:
(1) state clearly that section 301 is not intended to preempt state or
federal employment law statutes; and
(2) reaffirm a broad interpretation of the FAA's employment exclu-
sion and/or expressly repudiate the result of the Gilmer case.
Further, courts need to reevaluate their knee-jerk pro-arbitration approach to
cases involving statutory employment rights. They should narrow their
approach to section 301 preemption, interpret worker protection statutes to be
non-waivable, and adopt a broad interpretation of the contract-of-employment
exclusion in the FAA, so that employment contracts of all workers engaged in
interstate commerce are excluded from the Act. In addition, the courts and
Congress should adopt two recommendations of the Dunlop Commission: they
should ensure that binding arbitration agreements are not made a condition of
employment, and they should provide for judicial review of statutory issues
decided on arbitration.222
None of these changes will occur until employees, the labor movement,
Congress, and the general public recognize that while labor arbitration may
play a valuable role in resolving disputes concerning interpretation of collec-
tive bargaining agreements, extending arbitration to disputes over statutory
rights-especially for nonunion workers-is inappropriate. Expanding arbitra-
tion in this way may seem expedient in terms of reducing court congestion,
but it is a trend that will, in the long run, prove very costly. By subjecting
employment rights to a regime of private justice and cowboy arbitrations, we
are eliminating most employment rights for most American workers.
222. DuNLOP COMMISSION FINAL REPORT, supra note 187, at 32.
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